These are my mundane daily ramblings. For something
less spontaneous, I maintain The
Samuel
Johnson Sound Bite Page (over 1,800 Johnson quotes), with a
weekly essay springing from one of
Johnson's quotations.
Was Cheney trying to smear Edwards as
being overly ambitious? One of the questions which arose out
of last night's debate was Cheney's claim that he had never met Edwards before, when
Cheney, as president of the Senate, would have expected to:
You've missed a lot of key votes: on tax policy, on energy, on
Medicare reform.
Your hometown newspaper has taken to calling you "Senator
Gone." You've got one of the worst attendance records in the
United States Senate.
Now, in my capacity as vice president, I am the president of
Senate, the presiding officer. I'm up in the Senate most Tuesdays
when they're in session.
The first time I ever met you was when you walked on the stage
tonight.
Subsequent information shows this
isn't true. Another time they met was on NBC's Meet the
Press, and Media Matters has questioned why NBC debate
commentator Tim Russert — who hosts Meet the Press —
waited until
this morning to question Cheney's charge, instead of doing it
immediately after the debate. But something in what Russert said last
night caught my eye: (All emphases below are mine)
RUSSERT: [W]hen he [Cheney] turned to John Edwards and basically
said to him, you know what, you are a young man in too much of
a hurry. I never met you before in my life until you walked
on the stage tonight, it was basically saying to the American
people, you may disagree with me, but I am steady and I am
resolute, and I have a lot of experience, and you don't have to
worry about the government if I am a heartbeat away.
And then this morning (same link):
[H]e clearly is trying to give the impression that John
Edwards is a young ambitious man in a hurry who just doesn't
stop by the Senate and do his job in a serious way, but is out
campaigning and politicking, suggesting it's all politics.
Russert could be correct, because there was also this Cheney
bit in the debate about the qualities of a Vice President...
What [Bush] said he wanted me to do was to sign on because of
my experience to be a member of the team, to help him govern, and
that's exactly the way he's used me.
And I think from the perspective of the nation, it's worked in
our relationship, in this administration. I think it's worked
in part because I made it clear that I don't have any further
political aspirations myself. And I think that's been an
advantage.
So while some pundits are talking about Cheney's "I never met
you" as merely a small lie which is indicative of a broader
symptom, it could be part of a fabric that the RNC is trying to
paint Edwards as destructively ambitious: his ambitions will make
it difficult for Kerry as a President. Poppycock, of course, but
I wouldn't put it past them to try it.
Link
10:29 PM Home
More smoke and mirrors from our friend in
the White House. The cable networks were promised a major
policy address by the President this morning, and broadcast it in
full. Guess what? Just
your regular stump speech. I guess the real thing wasn't
ready yet.
Link
6:23 PM Home
Iraq was a threat that had to be dealt
with because, uh, because it's name is similar to "Iran."
Maybe that will be the next rationale, after the latest report comes out discounting even ideas that
Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass destruction:
The government's most definitive account of Iraq's arms
programs, to be released today, will show that Saddam Hussein
posed a diminishing threat at the time the United States invaded
and did not possess, or have concrete plans to develop, nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons, U.S. officials said
yesterday.
The officials said that the 1,000-page report by Charles A.
Duelfer, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, concluded that
Hussein had the desire but not the means to produce
unconventional weapons that could threaten his neighbors or the
West. President Bush has continued to assert in his campaign
stump speech that Iraq had posed "a gathering threat."
A fine quote. Today's Daily Howler criticizes the
inclusion of Ana Marie Cox, aka "Wonkette" in NBC's brief
post-debate coverage. Noting her tendency to irrelevant, uh,
"spicy" comments, Bob Somerby writes...
"Wonkette," by the way, seems to be an amalgam of two words:
"Wonk" and "Tourette's."
The AP has a piece which "fact checks" the
debate, and just for fun I'll give you a link to it over at
the Fox
News web site. It's a fairly good write up, although I was
struck by one point which seemed to allow for deceit I didn't
hear:
[Edwards] also asserted, "They sent 40,000 American troops
into Iraq without the body armor they needed," a comment that
might suggest they had no body armor at all, when in fact they
did.
Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said
40,000 troops did not have the brand new, improved armor but,
"every soldier and Marine on the ground over had body armor."
Personally, I didn't think Edwards implied they had no
armor, only that they were under-supplied; to bring this point up
seems like carping.
But it also gets into Iraq-al Qaeda discussions versus
relationships; Iraq and 9/11; and Kerry's record of voting on
taxes.
Yet for all that, it missed two key points:
Kerry never "voted for war," as Bush and Cheney continue to
contend. Kerry voted for an authorization of force: his stated
intent at the time was to give Bush clout in going to the UN to
get the inspectors back in. Here's what Bush himself said in Cincinnati prior to that vote:
(scroll down to the update for a better quotation)
Clearly, to actually work, any new inspections, sanctions or
enforcement mechanisms will have to be very different. America
wants the U.N. to be an effective organization that helps keep
the peace. And that is why we are urging the Security Council to
adopt a new resolution setting out tough, immediate requirements.
Among those requirements: the Iraqi regime must reveal and
destroy, under U.N. supervision, all existing weapons of mass
destruction. To ensure that we learn the truth, the regime must
allow witnesses to its illegal activities to be interviewed
outside the country -- and these witnesses must be free to bring
their families with them so they all beyond the reach of Saddam
Hussein's terror and murder. And inspectors must have access to
any site, at any time, without pre-clearance, without delay,
without exceptions.
(snip)
Later this week, the United States Congress will vote on this
matter. I have asked Congress to authorize the use of America's
military, if it proves necessary, to enforce U.N. Security
Council demands.
So was this a vote to launch war, or to get the inspectors
back in? Kerry said he was voting to get the inspectors back in.
Cheney repeated the charge about Kerry not supporting the
troops, pointing to the $87 billion bill which Kerry voted
against. Cheney also imputed Kerry's "no" vote to internal
Democratic party pressures, citing Howard Dean's rise in the
polls. Cheney's not alone in this view — it was also
mentioned in a recent Washington Post article but the AP
article doesn't mention that Bush also threatened to veto a
similar $87 billion bill where the funding was drawn differently.
The Kerry campaign may not be adequately concerned about
America's perceptions here. Joe Lockhart suggested that rather
than taking an "I'm rubber, you're glue" approach to
flip-flopping (pointing out Bush's changes over time), they prefer to criticize Bush's record: "We are
prosecuting a different case. We are not arguing that he's a
flip-flopper — he is — but that the policy choices he
has taken have failed miserably."
UPDATE: After posting this I learned that I failed to
really get at the core discussions surrounding the vote, that the
quotations above barely scrape the surface. Here is some
additional information.
Before the speech in Cincinnati, Bush had an exchange with the
press as part of a photo op; on that occasion, there was this...
Q Mr. President, are you going to send Congress your proposed
resolution today? And are you asking for a blank check, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: I am sending suggested language for a
resolution. I want — I've asked for Congress' support to
enable the administration to keep the peace. And we look
forward to a good, constructive debate in Congress. I appreciate
the fact that the leadership recognizes we've got to move before
the elections. I appreciate the strong support we're getting from
both Republicans and Democrats, and look forward to working with
them.
Q Mr. President, how important is it that that resolution give
you an authorization of the use of force?
THE PRESIDENT: That will be part of the resolution, the
authorization to use force. If you want to keep the peace,
you've got to have the authorization to use force. But it's
— this will be — this is a chance for Congress to
indicate support. It's a chance for Congress to say, we support
the administration's ability to keep the peace. That's
what this is all about. (All emphasis mine.)
Had the intention of the law changed between the suggested
language and the final version? Certainly not in Kerry's mind. On
October 9, 2002, just days after the Cincinnati speech, Kerry discussed the scope of the authorization for
force:
In recent days, the administration has gone further. They are
defining what "relevant" U.N. Security Council resolutions mean.
When Secretary Powell testified before our committee, the Foreign
Relations Committee, on September 26, he was asked what specific
U.N. Security Council resolutions the United States would go to
war to enforce. His response was clear: the resolutions dealing
with weapons of mass destruction and the disarmament of Iraq. In
fact, when asked about compliance with other U.N. resolutions
which do not deal with weapons of mass destruction, the Secretary
said: The President has not linked authority to go to war to any
of those elements.
When asked why the resolution sent by the President to
Congress requested authority to enforce all the resolutions with
which Iraq had not complied, the Secretary told the committee:
That's the way the resolution is currently worded, but we all
know, I think, that the major problem, the offense, what the
President is focused on and the danger to us and to the world are
the weapons of mass destruction.
Kerry then laid out the process he understood the President
would use in engaging the U.N., and went on to explain his
feelings about the future, should the President not comply:
If the President arbitrarily walks away from this course of
action--without good cause or reason--the legitimacy of any
subsequent action by the United States against Iraq will be
challenged by the American people and the international
community. And I would vigorously oppose the President doing
so.
When I vote to give the President of the United States the
authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein,
it is because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass
destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat, to our
security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. I
will vote yes because I believe it is the best way to hold Saddam
Hussein accountable. And the administration, I believe, is now
committed to a recognition that war must be the last option to
address this threat, not the first, and that we must act in
concert with allies around the globe to make the world's case
against Saddam Hussein.
As the President made clear earlier this week, "Approving this
resolution does not mean that military action is imminent or
unavoidable." It means "America speaks with one voice."
Let me be clear, the vote I will give to the President is for
one reason and one reason only: To disarm Iraq of weapons of mass
destruction, if we cannot accomplish that objective through new,
tough weapons inspections in joint concert with our allies.
In giving the President this authority, I expect him to
fulfill the commitments he has made to the American people in
recent days--to work with the United Nations Security Council to
adopt a new resolution setting out tough and immediate inspection
requirements, and to act with our allies at our side if we have
to disarm Saddam Hussein by force. If he fails to do so, I will
be among the first to speak out.
Clearly, Kerry expected Bush to fully commit to inspections.
The end game rhetoric of claiming that time was running out, that
there would be no vote on the findings of the inspectors, these
all fell far short of what Kerry had been led to believe. There
is no way in my mind that you could legitimately call Kerry's
vote a "vote for war."
Link
12:44 PM Home
It's the mistress, stupid. Media
Matters caught a bit
from Bill O'Reilly wherein he attributed the strength of
Clinton's European relationships to his having a mistress. "They
love that mistress stuff over there." This was his support point
for why he predicted that Kerry will be more successful in
dealing with Europe than Bush has been, and "it gives [him]
pause." Of course, the rumors of Kerry's
mistress were unfounded, and the media feeding frenzy only
served to make life very uncomfortable for the innocent.
Link
11:27 AM Home
The first reaction I posted to last
night's debate (although not primary in my mind) was
regarding Gwen Ifill's questions. If her only odd question had
been that one towards the end where she asked Cheney and Edwards
to refrain from mentioning Bush and Kerry, I probably wouldn't
have listed her as an issue. But I remember I was struck from the beginning. In an attempt to weave
recent events together into a question for Cheney, she asked,
Vice President Cheney, there have been new developments in
Iraq, especially having to do with the administration's
handling.
Paul Bremer, the former head of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, gave a speech in which he said that we have never had
enough troops on the ground, or we've never had enough troops on
the ground.
Donald Rumsfeld said he has not seen any hard evidence of a
link between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. Was this approved
— of a report that you requested that you received a week
ago that showed there was no connection between Abu Musab Zarqawi
and Saddam Hussein?
To what, exactly, was she asking Cheney to respond? The
administration's handling of... intelligence that Iraq and al
Qaeda were linked? Zarqawi? the war? the peace? What a bad foot
to get off on!
Later, when she asked Edwards about the global test Kerry had
mentioned in Thursday's debate, she read from the Thursday
transcript, but started at a point which ignored a directly
connected thought which Kerry had made. When asked about the
idea of preemptive war, Kerry responded,
No president, through all of American history, has ever ceded,
and nor would I, the right to preempt in any way necessary to
protect the United States of America. But if and when you do it,
Jim, you've got to do it in a way that passes the test, that
passes the global test where your countrymen, your people
understand fully why you're doing what you're doing, and you can
prove to the world that you did it for legitimate reasons.
That was what Kerry said, but Ifill only read this
part: "You've got to do it in a way that passes the test,
that passes the global test where your countrymen, your people
understand fully why you're doing what you're doing and can prove
to the world that you did it for legitimate reasons." This
completely ignored Kerry's statement that he would never defer
responsibility to defend the US to any other country's prior
approval. Edwards caught her on it, and reminded her of the
context, but still, she had some weird set of blinders on.
At two points she referred to a news article which had just
come out that day regarding flimsy connections between
Iraq and al Zarqawi. She referred to it once in her opening
question to Cheney, and later in a question to Edwards. Yet she
never told viewers what the report was, and I think she was
assuming too much on the part of the audience. For instance, the
second time she mentioned it, all she said was, "If this report
that we've read about today is true, and if Vice President Cheney
ordered it and asked about this, do you think that, in the
future, that your administration or the Bush administration would
have sufficient and accurate enough intelligence to be able to
make decisions about where to go next?" Now, how are the people
who hear Edwards' response supposed to evaluate it with the odd
bit of vague background which Ifill provided?
Many of the questions she threw were just plain slow pitch
softball, such as asking Cheney whether or not, from a VP
perspective, he still held a perspective he had four years ago at
Halliburton that sanctions against Iraq should be lifted. Soo
stupid: you don't need to be a political insider to have a
different view four years later. And of course, being no dummy,
Cheney swung at the pitch and drove it far, demonstrating
cogently that sanctions have to have more than one country
participating in order for them to work. Duh.
Later, she asked Edwards about the math behind reducing the
deficit in half by merely retracting tax breaks to those who earn
$200,000 or more. Here's how she asked it: "Senator Kerry said in
a recent interview that he absolutely will not raise taxes on
anyone under — who earns under $200,000 a year. How can he
guarantee that and also cut the deficit in half, as he's
promised?" If she didn't think the math works out, why didn't she
ask that specifically, pointing out why, rather than just giving
Edwards the opportunity to repeat campaign pledges without
supporting the math?
Silliness continued when she asked Edwards to reconcile the
Kerry-Edwards position on same sex marriages (they are against
legalizing them) with what is going on in Massachusetts (Kerry's
home state):
As the vice president mentioned, John Kerry comes from the
state of Massachusetts, which has taken as big a step as any
state in the union to legalize gay marriage. Yet both you and
Senator Kerry say you oppose it.
Are you trying to have it both ways?
Uh, Ifill probably forgot this, but Kerry serves in the US
Senate, and so far he has no say in the laws of Massachusetts.
Having it both ways? Was she suggesting that, in order to
reconcile his own opinions with those of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, that Kerry should move?
I have to admit I also bristled when one of her questions to
Edwards suggested that the Kerry-Edwards plan for
internationalizing Iraq might be "naive;" I think I would have
found the word "impractical" less baiting, but in the context of
all else that she did it was a minor offense.
Link
11:01 AM Home
Fairly even debate, I'd say, and I bet
the Bush-Cheney supporters are glad Cheney didn't repeat Bush's
miserable performance from Thursday. A few initial thoughts
without having a chance to consult a transcript:
What was up with some of Gwen Ifill's questions? That one
near the end where they weren't supposed to mention their
Presidential candidate's name, for instance...
Why?
Are there any Bush-Cheney supporters who don't know that
Cheney has a lesbian daughter? He seemed so incredibly lacking in
passion when talking about an issue which effects their family...
He didn't even mention her, never used the word "daughter"
— it took John Edwards' response to make it a human
question, and then Cheney bowed out of any significant comment
besides thanking Edwards for his kind words.
It seemed to matter greatly to Cheney whether Iraqi
casualties were included in the numerator and denominator before
you calculate the share of casualties which the US has borne. But
there is no formula by which our coalition partners bear
anywhere close to the share they bore in 1991. Under Cheney's
formulation, their share actually goes down.
Someone in the Kerry-Edwards campaign is going to have
to take the opportunity to explain the deal about the $87 billion
vote clearly and succinctly enough that it prevents the topic
being raised again; also that the vote to authorize force was not
a vote to war. They need to find a silver dagger.
I think Cheney scored a significant hit with the topic of his
closing statement (homeland security). Edwards' human story was
nice, but he missed an opportunity to talk about all the ways we
are at greater risk because of the was Bush has responded to
9/11.
I'll probably have more thoughts tomorrow.
Link
11:04 PM Home
Why do these soldiers hate America so
much? Via the Guardian, some emails which Michael Moore has received from troops in Iraq. One writes,
"Soldiers are calling their families urging them to support John
Kerry. If this is happening elsewhere, it looks as if the
overseas military vote that Bush is used to won't be there this
time around." Another: "The illiteracy rate in this country is
phenomenal. There were some farmers who didn't even know there
was an Operation Iraqi Freedom. This was when I realised that
this war was initiated by the few who would profit from it and
not for its people."
Link
4:25 PM Home
Bush campaign admits it's curtains. Kind
of, anyway. Ken Mehlman just said, "I believe in this campaign
the American people want to elect substance." He was talking
about Cheney vs. Edwards on CNN's Inside Politics just now, but
if the point pertains...
Link
3:45 PM Home
"I don't know why we didn't invade
Canada, it's so much closer." Leo Kottke, just now, on Al
Franken's show.
Link
12:59 PM Home
"We never had enough troops on the
ground,"
admits Paul Bremer, and not stopping the looting hurt us too.
"We paid a big price for not stopping it because it established
an atmosphere of lawlessness."
Link
11:16 AM Home
What job did Bush think he was running for
in 2000? I mean, I'm not just talking about how shocked he
seemed in the debate about how hard a job it is, but there was also
this:
MR. LEHRER: Mr. President, new question, two minutes. Does the
Iraq experience make it more likely or less likely that you would
take the United States into another preemptive military
action?
PRESIDENT BUSH: I would hope I'd never have to. I understand
how hard it is to commit troops. I never wanted to commit troops.
I never -- when I was running -- when we had the debate in 2000,
I never dreamt I'd be doing that.
"I never dreamt I'd be doing that." You know, the 9/11
Commission said that September 11 was a collective failure of the
imagination. Bush must have fit right in, if he never dreamt he
might need to commit troops.
"I would take the use of force very seriously. I would be
guarded in my approach. I don't think we can be all things to all
people in the world. I think we've got to be very careful when we
commit our troops. The vice president and I have a disagreement
about the use of troops. He believes in nation building. I would
be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I
believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and
therefore prevent war from happening in the first place. So I
would take my responsibility seriously."
Now, for someone who never dreamt that he would have to send
troops in to battle, that's a pretty cogent response. I wonder if
he thought that question in 2000 was just some wild
hypothetical? Hmmm.
What else do we know? Did we have troops anywhere in the
world, which might make such an issue relevant for a President?
Hmmm. There's Korea of course, and I think we had bases in
Europe, right? Japan?
And was Iraq looming on the horizon as an issue? Let's turn
the clock back and talk about the Project for a New
American Century, a group established in the spring of
1997 (this would have been before Bush campaigned in 2000).
This group is pertinent because in their
first statement, a letter to President Clinton, they
wrote:
We are writing you because we are convinced that current
American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding ... The policy of
"containment" of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over
the past several months. As recent events have demonstrated, we
can no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to
continue to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he
blocks or evades UN inspections. Our ability to ensure that
Saddam Hussein is not producing weapons of mass destruction,
therefore, has substantially diminished. ... The only acceptable
strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be
able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In
the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military
action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it
means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.
(Emphasis mine.)
Now, just because that idea is out there, it doesn't mean Bush
was in the loop on it, does it? Well, look at who has signed the
group's statement of principles: his brother Jeb, Dick Cheney, Paul
Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld... In short, it's highly unlikely that
Bush would have been unaware of the group's desires, seeing as
how his choice for vice-president had actually signed on.
Was there any actual contact between this group and Bush
during the 2000 campaign? PBS Frontline reported that in March, 1999:
Bush sets up an exploratory committee for a presidential
campaign and foreign policy experts descend on Austin, Texas, to
help prepare him for a White House run.
His tutors include both neo-conservative hawks, such as
Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld, and pragmatic realists, including Colin
Powell and Condoleezza Rice. During the campaign, neither side
will really know where it stands with the candidate.
All those ongoing international troop commitments; all that
discussion during the campaign; a question during the 2000
debate; and still Bush "never dreamt" he'd have to commit
troops as President of the United States. What job did he
think he was running for? Link
1:12 PM Home
Who had what intelligence? Bush has
been defending his pursuit of war against Iraq by pointing out "My opponent looked at the
same intelligence I looked at and declared, in 2002, that Saddam
Hussein was a grave threat." Well, did he? That would include
intelligence that the Department of Energy had rejected the
notion that the anodized aluminum tubes were unlikely to have
been used for uranium enrichment. Did Kerry really have access to
the same intelligence which Bush and his advisors had?
Apparently not.
Kerry left the Senate Intelligence Committee in January,
2001.
Not being on that committee when the march to war with Iraq
was heating up, he wouldn't have had access to all the
information that members of that committee would have
had.
John Judis & Spencer Ackerman wrote an analysis concerning
the selling of the war first published in The New Republic,
available online here. In it, they describe how crucial,
balancing footnotes were omitted from CIA reports as they became
less and less classified:
The Senate Intelligence Committee, in fact, was the greatest
congressional obstacle to the administration's push for war.
Under the lead of Graham and Illinois Senator Richard Durbin, the
committee enjoyed respect and deference in the Senate and the
House, and its members could speak authoritatively, based on
their access to classified information, about whether Iraq was
developing nuclear weapons or had ties to Al Qaeda. And, in this
case, the classified information available to the committee did
not support the public pronouncements being made by the CIA.
(snip)
In the late summer of 2002, Graham had requested from Tenet an
analysis of the Iraqi threat. According to knowledgeable sources,
he received a 25-page classified response reflecting the balanced
view that had prevailed earlier among the intelligence agencies
— noting, for example, that evidence of an Iraqi nuclear
program or a link to Al Qaeda was inconclusive. Early that
September, the committee also received the DIA's classified
analysis, which reflected the same cautious assessments. But
committee members became worried when, midway through the month,
they received a new CIA analysis of the threat that highlighted
the Bush administration's claims and consigned skepticism to
footnotes. According to one congressional staffer who read the
document, it highlighted "extensive Iraqi chem-bio programs and
nuclear programs and links to terrorism" but then included a
footnote that read, "This information comes from a source known
to fabricate in the past." The staffer concluded that "they
didn't do analysis. What they did was they just amassed
everything they could that said anything bad about Iraq and put
it into a document."
Graham and Durbin had been demanding for more than a month
that the CIA produce an NIE on the Iraqi threat--a summary of the
available intelligence, reflecting the judgment of the entire
intelligence community--and toward the end of September, it was
delivered. Like Tenet's earlier letter, the classified NIE was
balanced in its assessments. Graham called on Tenet to produce a
declassified version of the report that could guide members in
voting on the resolution. Graham and Durbin both hoped the
declassified report would rebut the kinds of overheated claims
they were hearing from administration spokespeople. As Durbin
tells TNR, "The most frustrating thing I find is when you have
credible evidence on the intelligence committee that is directly
contradictory to statements made by the administration."
On October 1, 2002, Tenet produced a declassified NIE. But
Graham and Durbin were outraged to find that it omitted the
qualifications and countervailing evidence that had characterized
the classified version and played up the claims that strengthened
the administration's case for war. For instance, the intelligence
report cited the much-disputed aluminum tubes as evidence that
Saddam "remains intent on acquiring" nuclear weapons. And it
claimed, "All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking
nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a
centrifuge enrichment program" — a blatant
mischaracterization. Subsequently, the NIE allowed that
"some" experts might disagree but insisted that "most" did not,
never mentioning that the DOE's expert analysts had determined
the tubes were not suitable for a nuclear weapons program.
The NIE also said that Iraq had "begun renewed production of
chemical warfare agents"--which the DIA report had left pointedly
in doubt. Graham demanded that the CIA declassify dissenting
portions.
In response, Tenet produced a single-page letter. It satisfied
one of Graham's requests: It included a statement that there was
a "low" likelihood of Iraq launching an unprovoked attack on the
United States. But it also contained a sop to the administration,
stating without qualification that the CIA had "solid reporting
of senior-level contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda going back a
decade." Graham demanded that Tenet declassify more of the
report, and Tenet promised to fax over additional material. But,
later that evening, Graham received a call from the CIA,
informing him that the White House had ordered Tenet not to
release anything more.
That same evening, October 7, 2002, Bush gave a major speech
in Cincinnati defending the resolution now before Congress and
laying out the case for war. Bush's speech brought together all
the misinformation and exaggeration that the White House had been
disseminating that fall. "The evidence indicates that Iraq is
reconstituting its nuclear weapons program," the president
declared. "Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum
tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are
used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons." Bush also argued
that, through its ties to Al Qaeda, Iraq would be able to use
biological and chemical weapons against the United States. "Iraq
could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical
weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists," he warned.
If Iraq had to deliver these weapons on its own, Bush said, Iraq
could use the new unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that it was
developing. "We have also discovered through intelligence that
Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles
that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons
across broad areas," he said. "We are concerned that Iraq is
exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the
United States." This claim represented the height of absurdity.
Iraq's UAVs had ranges of, at most, 300 miles. They could not
make the flight from Baghdad to Tel Aviv, let alone to New
York.
After the speech, when reporters pointed out that Bush's
warning of an imminent threat was contradicted by Tenet's
statement the same day that there was little likelihood of an
Iraqi attack, Tenet dutifully offered a clarification, explaining
that there was "no inconsistency" between the president's
statement and his own and that he had personally fact-checked the
president's speech. He also issued a public statement that read,
"There is no question that the likelihood of Saddam using weapons
of mass destruction against the United States or our allies ...
grows as his arsenal continues to build."
Five of the nine Democrats on the Senate Intelligence
Committee, including Graham and Durbin, ultimately voted against
the resolution, but they were unable to convince other
committee members or a majority in the Senate itself. This was at
least in part because they were not allowed to divulge what they
knew: While Graham and Durbin could complain that the
administration's and Tenet's own statements contradicted the
classified reports they had read, they could not say what was
actually in those reports.(Emphasis mine)
Note: Kerry did not have access to information that the
DOE felt the tubes were not for uranium enrichment. Got that?
Bush's claim that Kerry had access to the same intelligence is
a lie. Sadly, given the dots we have, we have to ask a
question we hoped we wouldn't have to: what did the President
know, and when did he know it? Link
8:03 PM Home
Condoleezza Rice, hoping you don't
notice. Rice was on ABC today, and was asked about the New
York Times article I mentioned yesterday,
wherein it was pointed out that in 2002 Rice appeared on CNN and
overstated the danger implied by some anodized aluminum tubes
which Iraq had ordered. (Recap: On CNN she had said the tubes
were "only really suited for nuclear weapons programs." In doing
that she was relying on the CIA's assessment, and ignored the
Department of Energy's assessment which was that they were likely
for conventional missiles, and not uranium enrichment. The DOE is
far more of an authority on centrifuge requirements than the CIA
is.) Here is the full transcript of Rice's appearance (all
bold emphases are mine)... The short version seems
to be that as a "policy maker" she felt sufficiently entitled to
concentrate on the larger truth she saw that it gave her liberty
to twist the actual information.
Here's what you said about that on September 8, 2002, on CNN
in the run-up to the war.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
RICE: We do know that there have been shipments going into
Iran, for instance -- into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes
that really are only suited to -- high-quality aluminum tubes
that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs,
centrifuge programs.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
STEPHANOPOULOS: But The New York Times writes this morning
that Almost a year before, Ms. Rice's staff had been told that
the government's foremost nuclear experts seriously doubted that
the tubes were for nuclear weapons according to four officials at
the Central Intelligence Agency and two senior administration
officials. The experts at the Energy Department believe the tubes
were likely intended for small artillery rockets. If the
government's top nuclear experts doubted that they were for
nuclear weapons, why did you say that they were only suited for
nuclear weapons?
RICE: George, at the time, I knew that there was a
dispute. I actually didn't really know the nature of the
dispute. We learned that -- I learned that later, as the NIE was
being produced, and that the Department of Energy had
reservations about what these tubes were for.
There were other people, of course, people, for instance, who
did rocket launchers, who said that they thought they were
unlikely to be for rocket launchers.
So what you had was a debate within the intelligence
community.
STEPHANOPOULOS: But according to this article, that debate
had been going on for more than a year, all through 2001. The
State Department had weighed in on the side of the Energy
Department, British intelligence had weighed in, Australian
intelligence had said that the idea that the tubes were for nukes
was patchy and inconclusive.
RICE: Unfortunately, George, the intelligence community
assessment as a whole was that these were likely and certainly
suitable for and likely for his nuclear weapons program, for
a number of other reasons.
STEPHANOPOULOS: ... the CIA's, and they were saying...
RICE: Well...
STEPHANOPOULOS: ... the nuclear weapons, not only for nuclear
weapons.
RICE: Well, the director of Central Intelligence believed that
the centrifuge part for these tubes, which were for centrifuge
parts, were a part of a procurement effort for a reconstituted
nuclear weapons program. Now, I'll point out that the Department
of Energy, of course, joined in the assessment that Saddam
Hussein was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program.
STEPHANOPOULOS: But that was separate from their judgment
about these aluminum tubes.
RICE: But George, the tubes were alongside a lot of other
evidence about experts being kept together, about balancing
equipment being brought in, about how these procurement efforts
were being funded.
When you're a policy-maker, you're sitting there looking at
assessments that say that Saddam Hussein is reconstituting his
nuclear weapons program. That's the key judgment. Secondly, that
he can have a nuclear weapon likely by the end of the decade if
something is not done about his program.
Those are assessments that cannot be ignored...
STEPHANOPOULOS: But that conclusion was based in part on
faulty evidence...
RICE: George...
STEPHANOPOULOS: ... on the aluminum tubes.
RICE: George, what we knew at the time, what we knew at the
time, was that there was, yes, a dispute in the intelligence
agency about this. And, by the way, knew later, as the NIE
came out, that there was a dispute within the intelligence
agencies about this, but that there was dispute only by one
agency, that's the State Department, about his...
STEPHANOPOULOS: Not the Energy Department?
RICE: No, the Energy Department said he was reconstituting
his nuclear weapons program. And when you are a
policy-maker...
STEPHANOPOULOS: But wait a second. They also said they
believed that the tubes were for rockets, not for nuclear
weapons.
RICE: George, when you are faced with an assessment that
Saddam Hussein is reconstituting his nuclear weapons program,
that he has, by the end of the decade, the probability of having
a nuclear weapon, when you know that the intelligence agencies
tend to underestimate these things -- after all, missing the
Indian nuclear test in 1991 -- when the IAEA actually got there
after the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein was much closer to a nuclear
weapon than anybody had thought, the tendency is always not to
want to underestimate these programs.
And that is, by the way, a methodology that I would stand by
to today.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Was...
RICE: A policy-maker cannot afford to be wrong on the short
side, underestimating the ability of a tyrant like Saddam
Hussein, who had expertise, who had weapons of mass destruction
and had used them in the past, and who kept a very strong intent
to keep those programs in place...
STEPHANOPOULOS: Well, then, today...
RICE: ... you can't afford to underestimate that.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Today, then, you know, the weapons inspectors
have found no evidence of centrifuges. Do you now accept that
these aluminum tubes were almost certainly for artillery rockets,
not nuclear weapons?
RICE: George, the fact is that what you know today can affect
what you do tomorrow, but not what you did yesterday. I stand
by...
STEPHANOPOULOS: Well, I'm asking about today.
RICE: ... I stand by to this day the correctness of the
decision to take seriously an intelligence assessment that Saddam
Hussein would likely have a nuclear weapon by the end of the
decade if you didn't do something. The assessment of the
intelligence community as a whole, and the director of Central
Intelligence, that he was reconstituting his nuclear program,
that he had biological and chemical weapons, if you put that in
the context of a dangerous man in the world's most dangerous
region, in whom...
STEPHANOPOULOS: I know, but that's...
RICE: ... still in a state of suspended hostility...
STEPHANOPOULOS: That's not precisely what I'm asking. Do you
accept today that these tubes were likely for rockets, not
nuclear weapons?
RICE: George, as I understand it, people are still debating
this. And I'm sure they will continue to debate it.
But whatever the case there, I stand by the decision to go to
war against Saddam Hussein and remove this threat to American
security, this threat to the Middle East, this thorn in the side
of any effort to build a different kind of Middle East.
When you're a policy-maker, yes, you can try and you can get
ground down in the details of this debate versus that debate. But
you have to keep your eye on the most important assessment. And
that was Saddam Hussein a threat? Of course he was a threat.
And anyone who believes that the world was better with a false
sense of stability with this dictator in power than we are now,
with an opportunity to build a different kind of Iraq as a
linchpin for a different kind of Middle East, really isn't making
a good judgment.
Note the difference here: Rice is mostly talking about the
safe conclusion in her eye (Hussein was reconstituting his
nuclear weapons or was in danger of successfully doing so
shortly); the specific claim that these anodized aluminum
tubes were intended for use in a centrifuge was debated, as she
admitted, yet she doesn't really talk about whether or not it was
ethical to claim certainty for that. And unfortunately
Stephanopoulus doesn't get her back on that; he might have
by saying something like "setting aside for a moment whether or
not the overall conclusion was reasonable, let's focus on what
you told the American people: you told the American people that
they were 'only really suited for nuclear weapons programs' when,
as you've admitted here... Now, why was that?"
Link
5:00 PM Home
Changes at a right-wing extremist
blog...Horsefeathers,
which ran that disgusting Open Letter to
Our Enemies earlier in the week — which argued for
transporting Arab-Muslims in the US to the desert, raiding all
Arab-American charities and so on — apparently decided it
didn't like all the nice comments it received in response to that
letter. They now want you to register in order to post a comment.
Link
3:42 PM Home
This was lying, plain and simple.Condoleezza Rice knew the aluminum tubes were
probably not for nuclear weapons when she said they
were on CNN.
In 2002, at a crucial juncture on the path to war, senior
members of the Bush administration gave a series of speeches and
interviews in which they asserted that Saddam Hussein was
rebuilding his nuclear weapons program. In a speech to veterans
that August, Vice President Dick Cheney said Mr. Hussein could
have an atomic bomb "fairly soon." President Bush, addressing the
United Nations the next month, said there was "little doubt"
about Mr. Hussein's appetite for nuclear arms.
The United States intelligence community had not yet concluded
that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear weapons program. But as the
vice president told a group of Wyoming Republicans that
September, the United States had "irrefutable evidence" -
thousands of tubes made of high-strength aluminum, tubes that the
Bush administration said were destined for clandestine Iraqi
uranium centrifuges, before some were seized at the behest of the
United States.
The tubes quickly became a critical exhibit in the
administration's brief against Iraq. As the only physical
evidence the United States of Mr. Hussein's revived nuclear
ambitions, they gave credibility to the apocalyptic imagery
invoked by President Bush and his advisers. The tubes were "only
really suited for nuclear weapons programs," Condoleezza Rice,
the president's national security adviser, asserted on CNN on
Sept. 8, 2002. "We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom
cloud."
But before Ms. Rice made those remarks, she was aware that
the government's foremost nuclear experts had concluded that the
tubes were most likely not for nuclear weapons at all, an
examination by The New York Times has found. As early as 2001,
her staff had been told that these experts, at the Energy
Department, believed the tubes were probably intended for small
artillery rockets, according to four officials at the Central
Intelligence Agency and a senior administration official, all of
whom spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive
nature of the information. (Emphasis mine.)
It's a fairly long article with lots of details about how the
Administration used the intelligence on Iraq. This is information
which won't be in an official senate report until after the
election, so read it now and share it with your friends, ok?
Link
1:36 PM Home
The global test. Conservatives are
making hay over this debate statement from John Kerry:
No president, through all of American history, has ever ceded,
and nor would I, the right to preempt in any way necessary to
protect the United States of America. But if and when you do it,
Jim, you've got to do it in a way that passes the test, that
passes the global test where your countrymen, your people
understand fully why you're doing what you're doing, and you can
prove to the world that you did it for legitimate reasons.
The ore which Bush supporters are trying to mine is in that
idea of a 'global test,' which they read as suggesting that Kerry
has said he would do what he explicitly said he wouldn't do: cede
the right to preempt a threat to the U.S. He said that, they
can't deny it. So what did Kerry mean by this seeming conflict of
a "global test"? Well, it's only a conflict if you deny the
richness of the English language, thus labeling yourself as a
buffoon once it's demonstrated. Beyond the international
connotation of global, there is also a connotation of
comprehensive or overall, and Kerry is not alone in using the
word global this way.
The problem arises when pundits who are either ignorant or
deliberately misleading act as if 'international' is the only way
the word global can be used, and expect that their audiences will
not understand it any other way. It harkens back to the Florida
politician who smeared his opponent by stressing that his
opponent's daughter was a thespian. It's just low. And
it's something they're entirely capable of doing (they're doing
it already). Prior to the debate, we knew they would do anything
to win, and now they probably feel they need to.
Link
11:43 AM Home
Safe from all retort, Bush acts tough.
I guess it's a compelling story of bravery under fire: think
about Bush's pathetic performance in Thursday's debate when under
pressure — his pauses, sputters, over-reliance on stock
phrases and so on — and compare it to how he talked yesterday on the campaign trail. He
reverted to accusations about Kerry which he knew he couldn't get
away with in front of Kerry. While Thursday night Kerry couldn't
have been clearer that he would defend America without demurring
to any foreign country,
A day after the first presidential debate, President Bush ripped
into Senator John Kerry on Friday as an equivocator who
denigrates American troops and who would subject national
security decisions to vetoes "by countries like France."
Now isn't that bravery and valor on the President's part? In
an arena where he won't be challenged by his carefully screened
audience, Bush resorts to lying about what Kerry said
again. This man is not Presidential timber.
Link
11:21 AM Home
"I know putting artificial deadlines won't work."
— President Bush, September 30,
2004
"Time is running out on Saddam Hussein."
— President Bush, January, 2003
Fun, ain't it? If Bush can not just take Kerry out of context,
but twist it and lie about it, let's have that fun! And
tell me why this is wrong, too...
Link
7:48 PM Home
Is it safe yet? In one of the comment
threads, Mike of Ishbadiddle
points to a released-private email from a WSJ reporter in Iraq
saying that all things considered you'd rather be in
Philadelphia... The link he provided isn't in the easiest format
to read, so you might try this one. Very much worth your time, if you
haven't read it. (I gotcher progress right here, Mr. Bush.)
Link
4:10 PM Home
Here's a quick question for you...
Pretend for a nanno-second that Bush isn't the incumbent. Did he
look like presidential timber last night to you?
Link
2:57 PM Home
Hardly "The Great Communicator," no
one will ever confuse John Kerry with Ronald Reagan. But there
were some flourishes last night which Kerry pulled off
exceptionally well. (Transcript here.)
Opening with a salvo of independence and superiority:
"I believe America is safest and strongest when we are leading
the world, and when we are leading strong alliances. ... I'll
never give a veto to any country over our security. But I also
know how to lead those alliances. This president has left them in
shatters across the globe, and we're now 90 percent of the
casualties in Iraq and 90 percent of the costs. I think that's
wrong, and I think we can do better." This of course builds on
perceptions of Bush as an isolationist, without ceding authority
to other countries.
His reference to Richard Clarke: Clarke is a
polarizing figure in politics these days because while he's a
conservative, he angered many Republicans for the way he talked
about Clinton (praise) and Bush (blame) in his book Against All Enemies and for
his apology in testimony to the 9/11 Commission. Kerry quoted
Clarke's point about the irresponsibility of warring against Iraq
after 9/11 ("Invading Iraq in response to 9/11 would be like
Franklin Roosevelt invading Mexico in response to Pearl Harbor");
but Kerry knew that saying the name "Richard Clarke" would
befuddle the message, so rather than do that, he identified the
idea as coming from "The terrorism czar, who has worked for every
president since Ronald Reagan." That was great: not only did he
remove the negativity associated with the name "Richard Clarke,"
but by pointing out his time under Reagan, enhanced the
idea.
His handling of "I voted for it before I voted against
it": "Well, you know, when I talked about the $87 billion, I
made a mistake in how I talk about the war. But the president
made a mistake in invading Iraq. Which is worse?" It was an
honest admission of an error, used as a springboard to get people
to start thinking about what really matters in this election
(judging Bush's performance and thinking about its implications
for the future).
Refocusing the audience on the issues: "The president
just talked about Iraq as a center of the war on terror. Iraq was
not even close to the center of the war on terror before the
president invaded it." With this (and another response) he
undercut Bush's argument that it was "worth it" to invade Iraq
and topple Saddam Hussein. On other occasions, Kerry has stressed
that the world is better off without Saddam Hussein, but
questioned whether war was the right way to do it.
Just really well done by Kerry overall. But this is not to say
he didn't have weaknesses; for instance, his allusions to service
in Vietnam seemed gratuitous (thankfully there were only three in
90 minutes).
Link
1:22 PM Home
Who do you mean by "we"? Slate's
William Saletan writes:
How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a
mistake?
That's what it all comes down to this debate, this war, this
election. For all the differences between Iraq and Vietnam, the
awful question John Kerry posed to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in 1971 is the same one hanging over us now.
This time, however, Kerry isn't raising the question. His
opponent, the president of the United States, is raising it. Why?
Because Iraq is different from Vietnam. We were attacked on 9/11.
We thought Saddam Hussein was behind it. We thought Iraq posed
the next threat. We don't want to believe that we were wrong,
that we've committed $200 billion and sacrificed more than 1,000
American lives in error. We can't imagine asking thousands more
to die for a mistake.
Bush can't imagine it, either. So, he offers himself and you a
way out. Ignore the bad news, he says.... (Emphasis mine.)
What "we" is he talking about? I don't recall getting a
membership card for that we-club. Never applied for it, either.
And I doubt he means these thoughts are limited to Bush, because
he goes on to refer to Bush with "either." Leave me out of your
club, Mr. Saletan.
Link
12:00 PM Home
Republicans finding comfort as best they
can, even stealing some. There seems to be a consensus that
Kerry "won" last night's debate (see this summary of poll results at Brad Delong's
blog). Over at the National Review blog The Corner, note is made
that the perceived winner of the first debate rarely wins the Presidential election:
INTERESTING [KJL]
More of what Bush camp is noting: How important is "winning" the
first debate? Since 1984, when Gallup began asking the question,
"Regardless of which candidate you happen to support, who do you
think did the better job in the debate?", only one candidate to
win this measure in the first debate went on to be elected. In
1996, Bill Clinton "won" the first debate and went on to be
elected President. Candidates Gore, Perot, Dukakis, and Mondale
all "won" their first debates, but failed to win election.
Sept. 30, 2004: Kerry 53/ Bush 37 (-16)
Oct. 3, 2000: Gore 48/Bush 41 (-7)
Oct. 6, 1996 Clinton 51/Dole 32 (-19)
Oct. 11, 1992 Perot: 47/Clinton 30/ Bush 16 (-17, -31)
Sept. 28, 1998 Dukakis 38/ Bush 29 (-9)
Sept. 28-30, 1984 Mondale 54/Reagan 35 (-19)
That 84 example is a tad relief.
What's wrong with their taking comfort in these? Well, look
at 2000: Gore won the first debate, he won the popular vote,
and if the voters of Palm Beach County hadn't been befuddled by
the butterfly ballot, he'd have taken Florida's electoral votes
and the election. It's just amazing to me how significant
details like this are conveniently "forgotten."
UPDATE: There were also debates in 1976 and 1980; I
wonder if they were left off because they're contrary to the
preferred spin?
UPDATE 2: I just heard Bill Schneider on CNN go through
the same drill on "Inside Politics," and his list also started in
1984. He also didn't asterisk the Gore result. I wonder if
there's no data for 76/80, or if he's taking his info right off
an RNC fax? And why didn't the RNC send that fax out in
advance of the first debate? If this were anything more than
dishonest damage control, it would have gone out before, it would
have been clearer about Gore, and it would have explained why the
analysis starts with 1984.
UPDATE 3: According to this page, the
post debate polls in 1976 had Carter and Ford "about even;" this page from Time magazine written in 1976 gives Ford
a slight lead over Carter (34.4% vs. 31.8%, with 33.8%
calling it a tie/no opinion; margin of error 2.9%). Ford's small
advantage was trounced in ensuing days over his Poland flub, and
he eventually lost the election. 1980 is more complex: incumbent
Jimmy Carter didn't participate in the first debate because 3rd
party candidate John Anderson qualified under the League of Women
Voter's rule — so really, Reagan won the 'first' debate
(and the presidency later). More pragmatically, Reagan won the
second debate (the first between him and Carter) with his famous
"There you go again."I haven't found any poll results to support
that. But needless to say, starting the analysis in 1984 is a bit
disingenuous, wouldn't you say?
Link
11:44 AM Home
Bush to pardon Enron's Ken Lay (and
other thoughts on last night's debate). Don't be disappointed
that I post this morning rather than last night: I'm the type
that considers "instant analysis" of limited benefit. But last
night we learned more about Bush's sense of justice when
he said that a Pakistani nuclear scientist had been "brought to
justice:" he had, but the leader of Pakistan immediately pardoned
him. Bush didn't focus on whether or not his operations had been
stopped, but that he had been "brought to justice." So, in
BushWorld...
On to more important thoughts: I found it interesting that the
two candidates' appeals were different: Kerry was based on facts,
Bush was based on belief or faith (in a non-religious sense).
Kerry's arguments referred to historical records (even when he
got them wrong, such as when sanctions were placed against Iran);
Bush reiterated key tenets, and in my view didn't use facts to
support his arguments as well.
It's not that Bush couldn't call on supporting information: he
did so, but what he called on doesn't do well in daylight. The
Pakistani nuclear scientist is one case, but there was also his
claim that Kerry had flip-flopped on the war an on the $87
billion to support the troops. He also pointed to progress in
self-governance in Iraq by talking about all the local forces
which had been trained, yet a Reuters article on Monday found
that Bush was overstating the figures. The overstatement is
an important plank in Bush's claim that rebuts July's
CIA-prepared estimate forecasting dark
scenarios foe Iraq.
It's tempting to say Kerry was better prepared than Bush was,
but since Bush was working at a disadvantage (defending his
record) I'm not sure what more Bush could have done than act
compassionately, which he did. At times, however, he sounded as
defensive as a child in the dean's office — he hesitated in
his answers, sounded formulaic, couldn't support his actions with
much more than central beliefs, and picked on his opponent.
Did Kerry do what he needed to know? I have no idea —
only November will tell. But I thought he was very clear to the
audience about points which he made in Boston and Zell Miller
twisted (that he would never cede to another nation when it came
to defending the US), and he was articulate about his position on
Iraq having been consistent. I think he should have
counter-attacked on the flip-flop suggestion, however, and
pointed out that Bush had threatened to veto an $87 billion bill
which would have supported the troops, and not merely talked
about his own record. I think he could have launched a massive
offense on Bush for how his flip-flops have put us at greater
risk (resisting/acceding to a 9/11 panel, resisting/acceding to
that panel's interview requests, resisting/acceding to their
recommendations, resisting/acceding to a department of Homeland
Security and so on). Kerry cannot point to any attacks within the
US since 9/11, and we're all thankful that there have been none,
nor would we have wanted one for the sake of political capital;
but Bush's several failures to address opportunities promptly
have not helped our situation in the least.
I also think Kerry did well in marshaling non-Iraq failures in
Bush's foreign policy, such as when Bush and Powell were giving
conflicting signals to North Korea in the spring of 2001 and not
working with other governments on global warming treaties. That
could have been made a lot stronger by talking about the
Geneva Convention, which is held in a vaguely sacred status by
the country, and I regret his not failing to make that.
Kerry also helped himself by usually being on target in his
answers; there were a couple points where I wasn't sure why he
started where he did, but he always spoke immediately, and
because his responses went to the question he came off as more
sincere to me.
Overall, I think Kerry won last night's debate, but that may
be due less to Kerry himself than to Bush being in the position
of having to defend his foreign policies.
Link
9:02 AM Home